Summary
The King's Cross fire occurred at the end of the evening rush hour, on 18 November 1987. King's Cross station is within the department's health district and we felt a responsibility to respond to the psychological aftermath.
The unique features of our intervention were the degree of inter agency coordination, the use of a systematic outreach and screening programme, the collection ofpsychotherapy outcome measures and the development of an ongoing clinic.
The work represents a sustained attempt to assess the nature and prevalence ofpost-traumatic reactions and the most medically and economically effective form of intervention.
In this paper we describe the way our team responded to the high level of psychological distress that we found, we present some preliminary results, outline two therapeutic trials, and refer to the longterm consequences for the work of our department.
The fire King's Cross underground station is the busiest, deepest and most complex station in Britain. In an average rush hour 40 000 people pass through a point where six underground lines converge and give access to the British Rail system feeding the north and east of the British Isles.
The fire started on the Picadilly line escalator. A passenger probably dropped a lighted match down through the side ofthe wooden escalator. Beneath the escalator the match lit inflammable material on the machinery. Confusion amongst the ill-trained staff led to a delay in calling the fire brigade. By the time the call was made the most closely located brigade were attending another incident. The escalator sprinklers were not turned on. The fire hydrant had been concealed behind a temporary hoarding.
Passengers were evacuated from the safety of the platforms up another set ofescalators into the booking hall where a flashover of fire erupted causing 31 deaths, major injuries to seven survivors, minor injuries to many others and psychological trauma to vast numbers of people. The first fireman to arrive rushed down into the station's subway network without putting on breathing apparatus and became one of the fatalities.
One person who was a passenger on that night described the fire as being like 'the holocaust and Hiroshima compressed into a second and rolled into one'.
Another later told of returning home after the fire 'and there it hit me, just how much a human life is worth and just how short a time it takes to snuff out. I have nightmares almost nightly, I wake up in a cold sweat, terrified that I might be next to die. I can't concentrate properly on anything, road signs and just normal everyday things.'
The injured were taken unannounced to University College Hospital. The first ambulance was opened by an inexperienced driver who was about to go off duty at UCH and had been asked to stay for a few minutes to handle some problems. He was one of our most serious psychological victims. Without warning, hundreds of staff, students and visitors to UCH were drawn in as helpers and bystanders.
Two hundred and fifty National Health Service staff including porters, receptionists and ancillary staff were involved in the immediate response. During the next 36 hours 12 000 people contacted the police in an attempt to find out information about friends and relatives. In the following months over 600 people made statements to the public enquiry concerning the events of that evening. Estimates of the numbers in the station and those who passed through while travelling on underground trains run into many thousands. For each person involved many others were aware of how easily they could have also been there had the events determining their evening been slightly different.
The psychiatric response On the first evening a number of psychiatrists and psychologists phoned in or arrived at the Accident & Emergency Department. However, the majority of the initial contact was with nurses, surgeons, anaesthetists and physicians and religious leaders. It was agreed that one psychiatrist would remain to deal primarily with routine emergencies which might have obstructed the disaster response and that the main psychological response would begin the next day.
Within the Academic Department of Psychiatry (University College and Middlesex School ofMedicine, London) the leadership role naturally fell to two psychiatrists and a psychologist who all had a prior interest in the response to massive stress. Ironically a small grant had just been received from a private company to help with what was already regarded as an inadequate service to Accident & Emergency.
It was agreed that these funds would be redirected and a project coordinator was employed. On the first day we visited all the senior professionals including managers who had been involved at the time of the fire, the Accident & Emergency Department and ward, the burns unit, and the mortuary. We made over a hundred telephone calls; those made in the hope of raising government funds proved unsuccessful.
Inter-departmental liaison was an important stage of this early work as much that followed was built on the foundations of thesq-personal contacts and the subsequently warm working relationships between normally independent dephrtments.
On the second day we held a imeeting ofexperienced therapists representing many disciplines and having fluency in many languages. Forty attended and many brought the names and phone numbers of others. As time passed a core group consolidated but new therapists have continued to be recruited. All the team's therapists work on a volunteer basis.
The following day we contacted the London Borough of Camden Social Services Department. We circumvented the risks of leadership conflict by setting up a multi-agency steering group with a helpline service coordinated by Camden social services. Many voluntary agencies were represented. The steering group helped mutual trust between agencies develop and allowed for the recognition ofdifferent experiences and skills. This meant an effective referral system could later be implemented making sure that people received the most appropriate form of assistance through social services, the voluntary sector or the Department of Psychiatry. The group also helped with the establishment of working relationships between numerous local and national agencies, as well as senior individuals and welfare departments in the Transport Police, the Metropolitan Police, emergency services organizations, London Regional Transport, and the enquiry and inquest.
We worked closely with the media to encourage those who had witnessed the disaster, or been bereaved by it, to feel able to approach us for help. The media were helpful in fulfilling this public health role.
Funding has remained a problem for both the social services team and the academic and NHS department although money from research funding bodies eventually became available 18 months after the fire. There is no doubt that this lack of immediate finance hindered the team's ability to contact and effect early interventions which may have helped prevent the development of subsequent psychological distress, with the attendant personal, social and economic consequences.
Initial outreach
We assumed that the situation was too serious and too urgent to just wait for self or agency referrals although we welcomed these when they occurred. Instead we operated a proactive service and took every opportunity to identify people-who might be in need of help.
The health service and social services are traditionally reactive organizations but the nature of distress after a disaster can include a natural ambivalence to seeking medical assistance and the prospect of re-telling painful experiences. Many people may avoid anything that reminds them of the traumatic event until the realization that problems associated with their experiences have not dissipated with the passing months or years.
We immediately divided the work. A psychiatrist and a social worker was allocated to every injuredinpatient, some of whom had severe post-traumatic reactions. One inpatient died almost immediately; of the other six, five received intensive psychiatric treatment either immediately or in the ensuing months, sometimes including daily contact with a multi-disciplinary team.
The academic department contacted all the National Health Service staff who had been involved in responding to the fire and coordinated the provision of low key and informal de-briefing which was often done in groups in the workplace by respected and wellknown senior nursing and psychology staff. The aim was to make people informed about the possible effects of stress and to provide an atmosphere in which discussion ofboth the personal and professional effects of the disaster could take place. This was backed up with the provision of written information about possible reactions and widely spread publicity about how to access more intensive and confidential help.
Nursing staff often view themselves as coping and caring professionals. It is a fully justified and positive self image that enables them to work to high standards in difficult circumstances but the nature of their experiences on that night left many shaken. Disasters by nature often make more demands on social systems than these systems are able to meet. People in the front line ofthis surge ofneed often feel unable to contain the tragedy as much as they feel they should.
The Camden social services helpline offered telephone support followed by face-to-face counselling and where necessary referral to the department of psychiatry. Twenty-five per cent of those who rang the helpline accepted face-to-face counselling and 35% of those counselled went on to accept further treatment from the Department of Psychiatry.
The steering group's work concentrated not only on the provision and coordination oftherapeutic services but also the development of many practical services; the provision of information about compensation, assisting with accommodation problems, arrangements for relatives abroad, and providing interpreters. At a later stage the group helped develop a newsletter and facilitated Family Action Group meetings to help create a sense of community for those most seriously affected.
In Dlecember, in a deprived inner urban health district we always expect a psychiatric epidemic. The effect of King's Cross was therefore superimposed on an existing high level of demand. After Christmas, which was a predictably traumatic time for survivors and families, we faced up to the pressure on our resources and developed a two-stage response.
Stage one involved continuing treatment of the highest priority cases but in addition the use of standard screening instruments so that we could assess the severity of the symptoms of everybody who approached us or with whom we established contact. Stage two meant assigning treatment according to the urgency ofneed, as measured by the screening results, with the most experienced therapists taking on the most complex cases. The screening instruments served the double function of informing treatment allocation and providing evaluative data.
The questionnaire material also provided a sensitive and sensible way of conducting an outreach programme by post. We were concerned to try and seek out contact with all those who could have been affected by the fire but were also aware of the possibility of intruding on personal grief. We found the use of a questionnaire pack comprised of the General Health Questionnaire 28 item version' and the Impact of Events Scale2 gave people a positive way to report their present state. The Impact of Events schedule is particularly apposite as it lists symptoms of intrusive recollections and avoidance behaviour which have been reported by people who had been in highly stressful situations themselves. Many who were wondering whether their responses were 'normal' or understandable found the relevance ofthis questionnaire to their emotional state extremely reassuring.
Uniquely, the official enquiry chairman Mr Desmond Fennell, after meeting us and scrutinizing our methods, wrote to everyone ofthe near 700 witnesses who gave evidence at his enquiry entlosing a covering letter and the questionnaire from our team. Nearly 200 responded; many reported a level ofdistress which led us to provide therapeutic services. None of these responders complained of the intrusiveness of the approach and indeed many wrote to thank us remarking that the recognition of their experiences on that night had helped and encouraged positive discussions with family and friends. Our services featured in the report of the official enquiry as an important recommendation for future procedures3. Table 1 shows the number of contacts our group managed to identify. In the first 18 months we reached 2000 people who were severely at risk of whom nearly 700 came back to us. Of these only 230 actually initiated the contact. The psychological aftermath peaked at the first and second anniversaries but we are still receiving seriously ill new referrals.
Results of screening
An initial screening of those who had ha%d ongoing contact with the Camden social services helpline showed 82% of passenger and bystanders met GHQ criteria for probable caseness (GHQ 28, Cutoff's 4/5, sensitivity 88%, specificity 84%). It-seems possible' that training and experience had' a marginally protective effect on the British Transport Police involved.
Results from all those who completed our screening questionnaires after their involvement in King's Cross showed that 44% of our contacts including emergency services groups, London Regional Transport staff, as well as passengers, bystanders and the bereaved reported levels of symptoms that indicated probable caseness.
Impact of Event Scale scores correlated with all measures of exposure to, and intensity of, stress.
The opportunity to talk about the fire afterwards was the only identifiable protective factor (Figure 1 ). Ofthe 50 subjects in this sample 24 reported that they had been able to talk about their experiences of the fire in detail and of these 92% felt that thi&had been beneficial. All those who came to our service after contact with the Camden social services' helpline also completed' an Eysenck Personality Questionnaire4. An analysis of these responses showed a positive correlation between neuroticism and L-scale scores and'GHQ and IES measure. For' the GHQ total score and EPQ neuroticism P< 0.01 (r=0.46, n=-47) and the L-scale correlated at the P<0.05 level'(r=0.25, n=47). Both EPQ sub-scales were 'standardized for sex and age. Further work on the inter-relationship and importance of personality factors and exposure measures to subsequent distress is under way.
Despite our efforts to coordinate the work of agencies we found that survivors were' contacted by many separate agencies which proved quite destructive since they had to repeat accounts of traumatic experience without resolution of their feelings (Figure 2 ). There were conflicting emotions underlying the suffering. As we know to be characteristic in man'made disasters, feelings ofanger were more important than feelings of guilt although the typical survivor guilt syndrome tended to' emerge once the defence of depersonalization, descried by Lifton after' Hiroima and Nagasaki has been stripped away5.
In people who went on to accept ongoing therapy, anger' was often directed at many targets; at those who had shown sympathy which quickly faded, at the perceived causes of the disaster, at the reporting of events, the chance nature of their involvement, at the challenge disaster presented to previous assumptions of safety and order within the' world, and at the re-evaluation of life that such an experience seemed to require. Of course for many emergency service workers who also reported such sym,ptoms anger was also directed at the organizational and managerial issues that effected how they were able to respond to the disaster. The first evaluation study Research is very difficult under conditions of overwhelming and urgent-need as well as lack of resources. We tried to introduce as much rigour as was feasible but for ethical reasons we deliberately blurred the roles of evaluators and therapists when clinical safety was paramount.
Design
A first trial used a pairs design with a matched in trial sub-sample, clients being taken into therapy either immediately or after 8 weeks on the waiting list with an end of therapy assessment and a planned one year follow-up which is now under way. Therapy was always time limited and the first contract was for 8 weeks; in practice, approximately a third of the patients renegotiated it to a shorter duration and a third extended it. A combination of dynamic and cognitive approaches predominated with occasional use of other techniques.
We supplemented the GHQ and the IES with the Index of Health Related Quality of Life6, the Symptom Checklist-907 and a purpose designed questionnaire about the experience ofthe disaster and earlier trauma.
Results
We identified a number of factors that seemed to increase vulnerability to post-traumatic stress disorder including high N and L scores on the EPQ, previous adjustment, childhood trauma and previous physical and psychiatric illness.
We found characteristics of the traumatic event that seemed to be risk factors in the development of subsequent disorders, particularly the subjects' experience of life threat. There were also a number of perpetuating factors to distress particularly not having had the chance to talk about the experience, the effects of subsequent stressful independent life events, publicity, litigation and compensation issues and extensive social disruption.
Our psychiatric outcome measures all followed the same pattern showing a marginal improvement during the waiting list period and a substantial improvement during therapy. At this stage in the trial it is not clear whether the total benefit is increased by a waiting list period.
The IHQL revealed that the prime effect oftherapy was on dysphoria. The waiting list period was used by clients to improve social adjustment especially organization at work. However, having reorganized life, the period of therapy was more likely to be accompanied by some disharmony in relationships. We do not yet know whether this re-stabilizes or whether a preventive intervention would be helpful.
The suffering of those who had witnessed the fire was so intense that special precautions had to be taken to maintain the psychological wellbeing of therapists and supervisors. The team developed weekly meetings for therapists and research staff to discuss experiences and provide mutual support. Indeed it has also served as an important forum for research and treatment developments. The use of debriefing sessions as a treatment option in more current work is partly a result of the evolution of therapeutic approaches discussed by the therapist team.
The second evaluation study We have set up a second controlled therapeutic trial which involves a more intensive psychiatric assessment using instruments which yield DSM-IHIR axis 1 & 2 and ICD-10 diagnoses. The extended assessments also include an examination of the relationship between the traumatic event, distress and previous life events. The trial is being conducted under randomized single blind conditions, and compares standard treatment which is a single unlimited debriefing session following assessment with a combination of the debriefing experience and time limited psychotherapy.
Events since King's Cross The therapist and the supervisor must face up to the fact of themselves becoming disaster survivors; each has had a mutative experience. The sharing of these experiences as well as accumulated knowledge is both sensible and protective. We have initiated a flourishing UK group which is attended by academics at every level of seniority, disaster relief workers, senior civil servants and many distinguished foreign visitors. This has become a vital forum for the development of work not only for the victims of mass disaster, but also for those affected by personal traumatic life events. The group has considered many ofthe theoretical issues in the phenomenology ofposttraumatic reactions as well as issues of effective and ethical treatments. It has also considered the legal, organizational, and political dimensions of future service developments.
Partly as a result of the continued relevance of such work to a wide range of issues and service developments the team that initially responded to the King's Cross fire has continued to operate. The 'Stress Clinic' within the department has been involved in advising on subsequent disasters and has been active in the response to Lockerbie relatives and to the Marchioness sinking.
Since the King's Cross fire there has been a wider acceptance of post-traumatic reactions following disaster. This has recently been reinforced by the legal acceptance of post-traumatic stress disorder not only as a positive psychiatric disorder for compensation purposes but also as a mitigating factor in a criminal action. A case at the Crown Court in January of this year involved a man who had been involved in the King's Cross disaster, and then entered a series of contingent personal disasters and committed a criminal offence. The Court of Appeal took the decision that psychotherapy for post-traumatic stress disorder was of such high priority that an 18-month prison sentence, which had already been reduced because of psychiatric circumstances, should be suspended so that treatment could occur.
Many of the lessons concerning the need for both professions and different geographical areas to plan for their response to disaster seem to have been absorbed as post-traumatic responses have received a higher profile. However, it is important that our awareness and understanding of the severity of posttraumatic reactions, and the need for a medical response, is applied in the provision of services across the spectrum of threat and trauma. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists may re-consider the role of threat and trauma in distress and illness and re-assess their responsibility to those who have been exposed to an overwhelming variety of threatening or traumatic events. As new services develop, and new understandings become widespread, so systematically collected data that allows for a consideration of the factors affecting post-traumatic stress disorder and its most effective form oftreatment will prove to be of paramount worth.
The unique feature of our evaluative work has been the extent and range of our assessments of posttraumatic symptoms, personality, exposure, and treatment outcome. Although detailed analysis ofthis data is still to be done it has been of major value to our continuing service. These assessments combined with therapists' shared experiences have led to continued refinement of therapeutic approach and service planning. An evolution of knowledge and specialization that along with the shared developments of our national and international colleagues will, we hope, ensure better responses to future disaster. The Piper Alpha installation Owned by the petroleum company Occidental, the Piper Alpha installation was located in the North Sea, 120 miles north-east of Aberdeen. It housed a community of about 200 men, many of whom were used to working in harsh and uncompromising conditions. Inevitably, their being confined to the rig for extended periods led to the development of a community spirit among men.
The disaster
The world's worst oil rig disaster began about 22.00 h on Wednesday, 6 July 1988, with an initial explosion which was to serve as a trigger for a series of explosions which culminated in the almost complete destruction of the installation above sea-level, including the main control room and the generator and power distribution system, with the resultant disabling ofthe essential and emergency services (including the emergency lighting and gas/fire detection systems). Moreover, all telecommunications and the internal and external alarm systems were incapacitated.
The launching ofthe lifeboats and survival craft was made impossible by the inferno on the deck area, therefore, almost half of the crew mustered in the large accommodation module to await evacuation by helicopterthe recognized plan for escape. The unremitting fire and smoke prevented the arrival of helicopters, with the result that the men who remained in the module succumbed to smoke and toxic fumes, before the platform collapsed into the sea. The majority ofthose who survived had been working in open deck areas and elected to effect their own escape either by jumping into the sea (in some cases from about 100 feet), or by clambering down the external superstructure. Few would ever regard the North Sea as an attractive refuge but, on that night, it was even less inviting because large areas of it were ablaze with gas-and oil-fuelled fire. Some of the men sustained serious injuries during their escape or whilst waiting on the platform for the rescue craft. These injuries (serious burns to the hands in particular) made it very diffilcult for the men to clamber aboard the stand-by vessels: a fact which added greatly to their suffering.
The men were faced in-the early stages with fire, smoke and toxic fumes, and there was much confusion and uncertainty, for example whether they should follow their instincts or the training procedures. Much frustration and anguish was also caused by the fact that, although rescue facilities were in sight, the craft could not approach close enough to effect a straightforward rescue.
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